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Guatemala has racked up an impressive 3,500 homicides so far this year, and that is just according
to official figures. The average rate of 16 per day surpasses that of the country's darkest days of
the internal war, which, between 1960 and 1996, claimed more than a quarter-million lives. The
international community responded to Guatemala's skyrocketing murder rates by sending to the
country a special rapporteur for extrajudicial, summary, or arbitrary executions.
Philip Alston arrived in the country Aug. 21. The comparison to the war years was Alston's. Alston
told the media by phone a day prior to his arrival, "Post-conflict societies do not always present
high indices of violence. Nevertheless, it is illustrative to analyze the example of South Africa,
which experienced much violence after the abolition of apartheid. A strong and vigorous campaign
to reinforce the effectiveness of the police forces helped a lot in reducing those indices. I believe
Guatemala has a lot to learn from other states in this regard."

The government is responsible
Five days later, having conducted his investigations and interviews, Alston blamed the government
for the insecurity. He had received reports from local human rights organizations, spoken
to officials, and heard testimony from victims' families. He said that the probability of the
perpetrators being apprehended, never mind convicted, was scant in Guatemala, "and those are
the responsibilities of the state...for the generalized impunity." Alston said he was particularly
concerned about the high number of apparently systematic or patterned killings of young women
(see NotiCen, 2005-02-10).
Another paramount concern is extrajudicial execution carried out by the Policia Nacional Civil
(PNC) and the Army, including "social cleansing" against members of the juvenile gangs, the maras.
While these crimes come back to the country as image damage with negative economic results for
the business classes, it is the poor who feel the brunt. "The rich can protect themselves, up to a
certain point, but the rest of society lives with the fear that a random assassination can affect them or
their loved ones at any moment," said Alston.
But for all Guatemalans, he said, "a society that lives under terror of murder cannot continue its life
or develop itself as it should." Representatives of social organizations presented Alston with a report
on 408 murders attributed to police, Army, and paramilitaries. The largest category of victims was
the mara youth. The report singled out several well-known alleged violators. Macario Mazariegos,
now chief of police at substation El Carmen in Zone 12 of the capital, has been charged repeatedly
since 1991 with extortion, bribery, assault, and threatening death, yet he has been repeatedly
promoted within the police force, both in the old Policia Nacional (PN) and the PNC, which was
©2011 The University of New Mexico,
Latin American & Iberian Institute
All rights reserved.

Page 1 of 3

LADB Article Id: 51618
ISSN: 1089-1560

reformed specifically to do away with this kind of brutality and corruption. After high hopes, the
reform has amounted to little more than new uniforms and substantial raises for the cops.
According to other reports made available to Alston, more than 2,000 charges have been brought
against police in 2006 for torture, robbery, planting evidence, forced disappearance, kidnapping,
inflicting grave injury, and illegal break-ins of residences. The Fundacion Myrna Mack presented
confirmation of narcotics and organized-crime police units acting as drug traffickers and informants
to the crime organizations. Alston noted that all this occurred with near-perfect impunity, and that,
while the government is not responsible for the thousands of executions reported each year, it is
responsible for failure to investigate, pursue, or bring suspects to trial.
Of all murders, only 5% are ever adjudicated. In the case of the murders of young women between
the ages of 10 and 30, 442 have been reported as of August, only 18% have been investigated, and
only 2% could end up in court. Critical of government though he was, Alston stopped short of
accusing the state of systematic social cleansing.
Other workers in the field were willing to go further. Iduvina Hernandez of the organization
Seguridad y Democracia (SEDEM) noted that some officials in and out of government espouse the
idea that some people are disposable and that "the only option is to eliminate them." She counts
the Public Ministry among these, accusing the ministry of failing to investigate murders in which
the victims have tattoos or criminal records. The procedure in these instances, she said, is that "the
crime scene is not secured, and there is a tendency not to consider those cases.
There are some accusations from mothers of murdered persons who say their sons did not have
tattoos, leading to the suspicion of the use of some kind of temporary tattoo being applied directly at
the scene of the crime." Far-fetched as this charge may sound, spokesman for the Procuraduria de
Derechos Humanos (PDH) Marco Tulio Alvarez supports it. "These practices undoubtedly involve
officers who have the backing of some authorities or superiors within the security forces," he said,
calling the practice "social cleansing."
No public figure in Guatemala seriously doubts deep corruption within the police forces. Even in
defending itself against charges of complicity, the government acknowledges police malfeasance.
Minister of Government Carlos Vielmann recently defended the government to the media by telling
them, "The current authorities are the ones who, more than anyone, have captured and consigned
the police, attending to the charges and purging the officers who violate the principles of the PNC,
to cleanse the entity. The cost of all this cleansing and countercleansing, say analysts, has been the
militarization of the security forces and the adoption of anti-democratic practices.
In the past two years, the PNC has contracted 3,000 soldiers and has stepped up combined militarypolice patrols. This, says Miguel Angel Albizures of the Centro para la Accion Legal en Derechos
Humanos (CALDH), is a clear violation of the 1996 Peace Accords, which expressly forbid such use
of the military, leading the country closer to a return of militarized civil forces. "Military intelligence
has not rested, it has always existed, and the proof of this is the operations in the Ixcan and San
Marcos," he said, referring to recent assaults upon indigenous communities in remote areas
reminiscent of the war years (see NotiCen, 2006-09-07).
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This militarization poses a double threat to Guatemalan society. Not only does it hearken back to
the slaughter of innocents during the 36 years of war, but it also subordinates the country's security
interests to US hemispheric interests, says Hernandez. That shifts Guatemala's emphasis away from
the terror in the streets and moves the government to solve its internal problems by criminalizing
youth, says CALDH's Abner Paredes, "since it is preferable to bring the Army into the streets and
invest millions to buy equipment than to invest in youth-development programs."

Outlook bleak for all but political opportunism
Alston concluded his brief visit to Guatemala leaving behind a fairly bleak outlook, at least in
the short term. The official response to his visit was largely opportunistic and political. President
Oscar Berger addressed the legislature, asking it to rally around a push to "defeat the forces of evil"
by approving a set of four bills he was sending up. One was aimed at facilitating the process of
registering weapons and of importers and sellers of guns and ammunition.
A second was a prison-reform bill, another would create a national institute for forensic science,
and the last would regulate private-security companies. The speech was carried on national TV and
radio. Rather than rally around, the opposition saw opportunity. Anabella de Leon of the Partido
Patriota (PP) asked, "Why now, in the third year of his term, is he seeking this consensus? It should
not be in the third year of failure that he turns to us for support and expresses his concern about
security." The PP has a plan of its own to deal with the situation and is building the presidential
campaign of its founder, ex-Gen. Otto Perez Molina, around it.
Perez Molina has proposed a mano-dura (hard-line) approach to security, very much like the
profoundly punitive strategies against gang violence that have failed so spectacularly in El Salvador
and Honduras (see NotiCen, 2004-02-05, 2004-06-24, 2005-03-03). The general had reason to believe
that Berger had pre-empted him since he too was pushing a weapons bill, a private-securityregulation bill, and a public-order bill. He also wants to purge the police, increase the number of
police, and purge the judicial system. But his best chance for the next presidency lies with the manodura approach.
Human rights advocates point out that the country has no real experience with successful
democracy and has historically opted for authoritarian approaches to crime when it overreached
tolerable limits. Perez Molina has said he simply wants to do for Guatemala what Rudolph Guiliani
did for New York. But Albizures hears more of Gen. Efrain Rios Montt, during whose brief de facto
presidency the country was made safe from street crime with a wave of extrajudicial killings, than
he does of the former New York City mayor in Perez's plans. "Surely there is a clamor for security
and for the control of delinquency," said the human rights activist, "but preventive or readjustment
measures are not proposed nor are alternatives offered to the young. Repression is proposed instead
of social investment."

-- End --
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